Jefferson to Adams
Jefferson argues for war rather than tribute
Thomas Jefferson to John Adams
Replying to Adams’s four propositions, Jefferson lays out why he would rather win peace from Algiers by war than buy it. He costs out a 150-gun fleet, proposes a league with Naples and Portugal, and pledges to follow whatever plan is adopted.
- From
- Paris
- Period
- Ministers in Europe, 1784–1789
- Length
- 1,117 words · 6 min read
The letter
Paris, July 11, 1786
Paris July 11. 1786.
Dear Sir,
Dear Sir
Our instructions11 on the Barbary states22 required us to seek peace with them by negotiation, so it became our duty to do that as well as we could. Whatever our private opinions might be, we were to keep them to ourselves and follow the course laid down for us. We have done so, honestly and zealously. It was therefore never necessary for us to consult together on the best plan of conduct toward these states. I admit that very early on I thought it would be best to win a peace by means of war. Although this question is none of our business, you propose some discussion of it, so I shall trouble you with my reasons. Of the four propositions laid down in your letter of the 3rd of this month,33 I agree with the first three. In substance they say that the good offices of our friends cannot get us a peace without paying its price; that they cannot much lessen that price; and that if we pay it, we can have the peace in spite of the intrigues of our enemies. As to the fourth, that the longer the negotiation is delayed the larger the demand will be, that will depend on the captures made in the meantime:44 if they are many and rich, the price may rise; if few and poor, it will fall. However, if it is decided that we shall buy a peace, I know no reason to delay the business; I should rather think it ought to be hurried. But I should prefer to obtain peace by war. 1. Justice favors this opinion. 2. Honor favors it. 3. It will win us respect in Europe, and respect is a safeguard to interest. 4. It will arm the federal head55 with the safest of all instruments for compelling its delinquent members, and keep it from using one that would be less safe. So far, I think, you go with me. But at the next steps we shall differ. 5. I think it the least expensive course. 6. It is equally effective. I ask for a fleet of 150 guns, half of which shall be constantly at sea on cruise. Built, manned and supplied with provisions for six months, this fleet will cost £450,000 sterling. Its annual expense is £300 sterling a gun, everything included, which comes to £45,000 sterling a year. I take British experience as the basis of my calculations, although we know from our own experience that we can do in this line for pounds lawful66 what costs them pounds sterling. If we charged all this to the Algerine war, it would come to little more than we must pay if we buy peace. But it is proper and necessary that we establish a small naval force even if we were to buy a peace from the Algerines, and that force, laid up in our dockyards, would cost us half as much each year as if it were kept ready for service. So we have a right to say that only £22,500 sterling a year should be charged to the Algerine war. 6. It will be as effective. Against all the mismanagements of Spain and Portugal77 that are urged to show that war against those people does not work, I set a single fact that proves the contrary wherever there is any management. About forty years ago, when the Algerines had broken their treaty with France, this court sent Monsieur de Massiac88 with one large and two small frigates. He blockaded the harbor of Algiers for three months, and they signed the terms he dictated. If it is granted, however, that war, even on the fairest prospects, is still exposed to uncertainties, I weigh against this the greater uncertainty of how long a peace will last that is bought with money, from such a people, from a Dey eighty years old,99 and by a nation that, if it buys peace, is to have no power at sea to make them keep it.
Our instructions1 relative to the Barbary states2 having required us to proceed by way of negotiation to obtain their peace, it became our duty to do this to the best of our power. Whatever might be our private opinions, they were to be suppressed, and the line marked out to us, was to be followed. It has been so honestly, and zealously. It was therefore never material for us to consult together on the best plan of conduct towards these states. I acknolege I very early thought it would be best to effect a peace thro’ the medium of war. Tho’ it is a question with which we have nothing to do, yet as you propose some discussion of it I shall trouble you with my reasons. Of the 4. positions laid down in your letter of the 3d. instant3, I agree to the three first, which are in substance that the good offices of our friends cannot procure us a peace without paying it’s price, that they cannot materially lessen that price, and that paying it, we can have the peace in spight of the intrigues of our enemies. As to the 4th. that the longer the negotiation is delayed the larger will be the demand, this will depend on the intermediate captures4: if they are many and rich the price may be raised; if few and poor it will be lessened. However if it is decided that we shall buy a peace, I know no reason for delaying the operation, but should rather think it ought to be hastened. But I should prefer the obtaining it by war. 1. Justice is in favor of this opinion. 2. Honor favors it. 3. It will procure us respect in Europe, and respect is a safe-guard to interest. 4. It will arm the federal head5 with the safest of all the instruments of coercion over their delinquent members and prevent them from using what would be less safe. I think that so far you go with me. But in the next steps we shall differ. 5. I think it least expensive. 6. Equally effectual. I ask a fleet of 150. guns, the one half of which shall be in constant cruise. This fleet built, manned and victualled for 6. months will cost 450,000£ sterling. It’s annual expence is 300£ sterl. a gun, including every thing: this will be 45,000£ sterl. a year. I take British experience for the basis of my calculations, tho’ we know, from our own experience, that we can do, in this way, for pounds lawful6, what costs them pounds sterling. Were we to charge all this to the Algerine war it would amount to little more than we must pay if we buy peace. But as it is proper and necessary that we should establish a small marine force (even were we to buy a peace from the Algerines,) and as that force laid up in our dockyards would cost us half as much annually as if kept in order for service, we have a right to say that only 22,500£ sterl. per ann. should be charged to the Algerine war. 6. It will be as effectual. To all the mismanagements of Spain and Portugal7 urged to shew that war against those people is ineffectual, I urge a single fact to prove the contrary where there is any management. About 40. year ago, the Algerines having broke their treaty with France, this court sent Monsr. de Massac8 with one large and two small frigates, he blockaded the harbour of Algiers three months, and they subscribed to the terms he dictated. If it be admitted however that war, on the fairest prospects, is still exposed to incertainties, I weigh against this the greater incertainty of the duration of a peace bought with money, from such a people, from a Dey 80. years old9, and by a nation who, on the hypothesis of buying peace, is to have no power on the sea to enforce an observance of it.
So far I have assumed that the whole weight of this war would rest on us. But, first, Naples will join us.1010 The character of its naval minister (Acton),1111 his known feelings about the peace that Spain is officiously trying to make for Naples, and his hostility toward the Algerines give the strongest reason to believe it. Second, every principle of reason tells us that Portugal will join us.1212 I say this taking for granted what everyone seems to believe, that Portugal will not make peace with Algiers. I suppose, then, that a convention1313 might be formed among Portugal, Naples and the United States, by which the burden of the war would be divided among them in shares according to their respective wealth, and which would last until Algiers agreed to a peace with all three on equal terms. It might be left open for other nations to join. Many, if not most, of the powers of Europe (except France, England, Holland, and Spain if her peace is made) would sooner or later enter the league, so that their peace with the piratical states would be guaranteed by all of them together. In that case, I suppose, our share of the force would not be half of what I first calculated.
So far I have gone on the supposition that the whole weight of this war would rest on us. But 1. Naples will join us10. The character of their naval minister (Acton11), his known sentiments with respect to the peace Spain is officiously trying to make for them, and his dispositions against the Algerines give the greatest reason to believe it. 2. Every principle of reason tells us Portugal will join us12. I state this as taking for granted, what all seem to believe, that they will not be at peace with Algiers. I suppose then that a Convention13 might be formed between Portugal, Naples and the U.S. by which the burthen of the war might be quotaed on them according to their respective wealth, and the term of it should be when Algiers should subscribe to a peace with all three on equal terms. This might be left open for other nations to accede to, and many, if not most of the powers of Europe (except France, England, Holland and Spain if her peace be made) would sooner or later enter into the confederacy, for the sake of having their peace with the Pyratical states guarantied by the whole. I suppose that in this case our proportion of force would not be the half of what I first calculated on.
These are the reasons that have shaped my judgment on this question. I give them to you to show that if I am deceived, it is at least by an appearance of reason, and not in any hope that they will change your opinion. You have viewed the subject, I am sure, from every side. You have weighed both questions with all their circumstances. You reach a different result from mine.1415 The same facts strike us differently. That is enough to make me suspect an error in my reasoning, although I cannot find it. It does not matter, since I have no say in the decision, and I am ready to go forward wholeheartedly on any other plan that may be adopted, if my services are thought useful. As to the attitudes of the states, I know nothing at all. Still, I cannot help thinking that, on a view of all the circumstances, they might be united behind either plan.
These are the reasons which have influenced my judgment on this question. I give them to you to shew you that I am imposed on14 by a semblance of reason at least, and not with an expectation of their changing your opinion. You have viewed the subject, I am sure in all it’s bearings. You have weighed both questions with all their circumstances. You make the result different from what I do15. The same facts impress us differently. This is enough to make me suspect an error in my process of reasoning tho’ I am not able to detect it. It is of no consequence; as I have nothing to say in the decision, and am ready to proceed heartily on any other plan which may be adopted, if my agency should be thought useful. With respect to the dispositions of the states I am utterly uninformed. I cannot help thinking however that on a view of all circumstances, they might be united in either of the plans.
I have written this on receiving your letter, without knowing of any opportunity to send it, so I do not know when it will go. I therefore add nothing on any other subject except assurances of the sincere esteem and respect with which I am, dear Sir, your friend and servant,
Having written this on the receipt of your letter, without knowing of any opportunity of sending it, I know not when it will go; I add nothing therefore on any other subject but assurances of the sincere esteem and respect with which I am Dear Sir your friend & servant,
Th. Jefferson
Th: Jefferson
Notes1415
our instructionsLaw and politics
In 1784 Congress made Adams, Franklin and Jefferson joint commissioners for treaties with the Barbary powers. In March 1785 it sent them formal commissions, let them appoint agents, and allowed them to spend up to $80,000 to reach terms. Jefferson’s point is that these orders called for negotiation, not war.
Source: John Jay to the American Commissioners, 11 March 1785 (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab)
Barbary statesPlace
Morocco and the Ottoman regencies of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli on the North African coast. Their corsairs seized merchant ships and enslaved the crews of nations that had no treaty with them, and such treaties were normally bought with money and gifts.
Sources: First Barbary War, Thomas Jefferson Encyclopedia (Monticello) (opens in a new tab); To the Shores of Tripoli, Colonial Williamsburg Journal (opens in a new tab)
your letter of 3 JulyCross-reference
Adams’s letter of 3 July 1786, which Jefferson received on 10 July. In it Adams set out four numbered propositions on buying peace from the Barbary powers, concluded that the United States should pay without delay, and asked Jefferson and Lafayette which points they disputed.
Adams to Jefferson, July 3, 1786
Source: John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, 3 July 1786 (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab)
intermediate capturesEvent
These are ships Algiers might seize while talks dragged on. Algerine corsairs had already taken two American vessels in July 1785, the Maria of Boston and the Dauphin of Philadelphia, and were holding their crews for ransom. Each new prize would strengthen the Dey’s bargaining position.
Source: Jefferson's report on American captives in Algiers, 1790 (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab)
the federal headIdea
This means Congress under the Articles of Confederation. It could ask the states for money but had no power to make them pay, and many states fell behind. Jefferson argued that a navy would give Congress a safe means of pressing delinquent states, safer than an army. He made the same case to James Monroe in August 1786.
Source: Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 11 August 1786 (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab)
pounds lawfulMoney
“Lawful money” was the local money of account in several American states. Its pound was worth less than the British pound sterling: in Massachusetts, from 1750, £133⅓ lawful money equalled £100 sterling. Jefferson means that Americans could build and run ships for fewer real pounds than Britain spent.
Sources: Colonial currency values, Notre Dame Colonial Currency project (opens in a new tab); Massachusetts currency chapter, Taylor & Francis (opens in a new tab)
mismanagements of Spain and PortugalEvent
Spanish fleets under Admiral Antonio Barceló bombarded Algiers in 1783 and again in 1784 without forcing it to give in. Spain then turned to negotiation and bought a peace in 1785–86. Adams and others took this as proof that force did not work against Algiers.
Sources: Plano de la bahía de Argel (Algiers, 1783), Royal Collection Trust (opens in a new tab); William Carmichael to Thomas Jefferson, 16 May 1786 (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab)
Monsieur de MassiacPerson
Claude-Louis d’Espinchal, marquis de Massiac (1686–1770), was a French naval officer. He served briefly as naval minister in 1758 and later became a vice admiral. The comte d’Estaing described Massiac’s method for blockading Algiers to Jefferson in May 1786. The exact year of the blockade is uncertain.
Sources: D'Estaing to Thomas Jefferson, 17 May 1786 (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab); Secrétaires d'État à la Marine, Université Laval (CEFAN) (opens in a new tab)
the Dey of AlgiersPerson
This was Muhammad ben Osman, called “Mahomet Pacha” in American papers. He had ruled Algiers as dey since 1766 and died in office on 12 July 1791, when his chief minister, Hassan, succeeded him. His exact age is uncertain. Jefferson’s point is that a peace bought from an old ruler might not outlast him.
Source: Enclosure: Algier's affair, 4 September [1791] (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab)
NaplesPlace
The Kingdom of Naples in southern Italy was at war with Algiers in 1786. After making its own treaty, Spain tried to arrange a peace for Naples too, and the American agent in Madrid, William Carmichael, followed those uncertain talks through that summer.
Sources: William Carmichael to Thomas Jefferson, 17 August 1786 (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab); William Carmichael to Thomas Jefferson, 4 September 1786 (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab)
ActonPerson
Sir John Acton (1736–1811) was an Englishman born at Besançon in France. He commanded Tuscany’s navy before moving to Naples in 1779 to rebuild its fleet. Favored by Queen Maria Carolina, he rose to control Naples’s navy, war and finance and later became chief minister. Jefferson relied on his hostility to Algiers.
Sources: Sir John Francis Edward Acton, 6th Baronet, Encyclopaedia Britannica (opens in a new tab); Acton, John Francis Edward, Dictionary of National Biography (1885–1900) (opens in a new tab)
PortugalEvent
Portugal was at war with Algiers, and its warships patrolling the Strait of Gibraltar kept Algerine corsairs mostly inside the Mediterranean. In 1786 Queen Maria I ordered that squadron to protect American ships as well as Portuguese ones. Adams had passed this news to Jefferson.
Sources: William Stephens Smith's Commission for His Mission to Portugal, 11 April 1787 (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab); John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, 3 July 1786 (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab)
a ConventionBook or text
Jefferson soon put this idea on paper as a proposed convention among the powers at war with the Barbary states, who would share the cost of a joint naval force. He worked it out with Lafayette and the comte d’Estaing and sent it to John Jay in October 1786, but no such league was formed.
Sources: Jefferson's Proposed Concert of Powers against the Barbary States, editorial note (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab); Proposed Convention against the Barbary States (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab)
Adams’s replyCross-reference
Adams answered on 31 July 1786. He wrote that the United States ought not to fight the Barbary states at all unless it meant to fight them forever. He added that Algiers had since been fortified all round, so a blockade like Massiac’s would now be harder.
One more note explains a word of the original that the modern text does not use. Switch to the original to read it.
our instructionsLaw and politics
In 1784 Congress made Adams, Franklin and Jefferson joint commissioners for treaties with the Barbary powers. In March 1785 it sent them formal commissions, let them appoint agents, and allowed them to spend up to $80,000 to reach terms. Jefferson’s point is that these orders called for negotiation, not war.
Source: John Jay to the American Commissioners, 11 March 1785 (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab)
Barbary statesPlace
Morocco and the Ottoman regencies of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli on the North African coast. Their corsairs seized merchant ships and enslaved the crews of nations that had no treaty with them, and such treaties were normally bought with money and gifts.
Sources: First Barbary War, Thomas Jefferson Encyclopedia (Monticello) (opens in a new tab); To the Shores of Tripoli, Colonial Williamsburg Journal (opens in a new tab)
your letter of 3 JulyCross-reference
Adams’s letter of 3 July 1786, which Jefferson received on 10 July. In it Adams set out four numbered propositions on buying peace from the Barbary powers, concluded that the United States should pay without delay, and asked Jefferson and Lafayette which points they disputed.
Adams to Jefferson, July 3, 1786
Source: John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, 3 July 1786 (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab)
intermediate capturesEvent
These are ships Algiers might seize while talks dragged on. Algerine corsairs had already taken two American vessels in July 1785, the Maria of Boston and the Dauphin of Philadelphia, and were holding their crews for ransom. Each new prize would strengthen the Dey’s bargaining position.
Source: Jefferson's report on American captives in Algiers, 1790 (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab)
the federal headIdea
This means Congress under the Articles of Confederation. It could ask the states for money but had no power to make them pay, and many states fell behind. Jefferson argued that a navy would give Congress a safe means of pressing delinquent states, safer than an army. He made the same case to James Monroe in August 1786.
Source: Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 11 August 1786 (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab)
pounds lawfulMoney
“Lawful money” was the local money of account in several American states. Its pound was worth less than the British pound sterling: in Massachusetts, from 1750, £133⅓ lawful money equalled £100 sterling. Jefferson means that Americans could build and run ships for fewer real pounds than Britain spent.
Sources: Colonial currency values, Notre Dame Colonial Currency project (opens in a new tab); Massachusetts currency chapter, Taylor & Francis (opens in a new tab)
mismanagements of Spain and PortugalEvent
Spanish fleets under Admiral Antonio Barceló bombarded Algiers in 1783 and again in 1784 without forcing it to give in. Spain then turned to negotiation and bought a peace in 1785–86. Adams and others took this as proof that force did not work against Algiers.
Sources: Plano de la bahía de Argel (Algiers, 1783), Royal Collection Trust (opens in a new tab); William Carmichael to Thomas Jefferson, 16 May 1786 (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab)
Monsieur de MassiacPerson
Claude-Louis d’Espinchal, marquis de Massiac (1686–1770), was a French naval officer. He served briefly as naval minister in 1758 and later became a vice admiral. The comte d’Estaing described Massiac’s method for blockading Algiers to Jefferson in May 1786. The exact year of the blockade is uncertain.
Sources: D'Estaing to Thomas Jefferson, 17 May 1786 (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab); Secrétaires d'État à la Marine, Université Laval (CEFAN) (opens in a new tab)
the Dey of AlgiersPerson
This was Muhammad ben Osman, called “Mahomet Pacha” in American papers. He had ruled Algiers as dey since 1766 and died in office on 12 July 1791, when his chief minister, Hassan, succeeded him. His exact age is uncertain. Jefferson’s point is that a peace bought from an old ruler might not outlast him.
Source: Enclosure: Algier's affair, 4 September [1791] (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab)
NaplesPlace
The Kingdom of Naples in southern Italy was at war with Algiers in 1786. After making its own treaty, Spain tried to arrange a peace for Naples too, and the American agent in Madrid, William Carmichael, followed those uncertain talks through that summer.
Sources: William Carmichael to Thomas Jefferson, 17 August 1786 (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab); William Carmichael to Thomas Jefferson, 4 September 1786 (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab)
ActonPerson
Sir John Acton (1736–1811) was an Englishman born at Besançon in France. He commanded Tuscany’s navy before moving to Naples in 1779 to rebuild its fleet. Favored by Queen Maria Carolina, he rose to control Naples’s navy, war and finance and later became chief minister. Jefferson relied on his hostility to Algiers.
Sources: Sir John Francis Edward Acton, 6th Baronet, Encyclopaedia Britannica (opens in a new tab); Acton, John Francis Edward, Dictionary of National Biography (1885–1900) (opens in a new tab)
PortugalEvent
Portugal was at war with Algiers, and its warships patrolling the Strait of Gibraltar kept Algerine corsairs mostly inside the Mediterranean. In 1786 Queen Maria I ordered that squadron to protect American ships as well as Portuguese ones. Adams had passed this news to Jefferson.
Sources: William Stephens Smith's Commission for His Mission to Portugal, 11 April 1787 (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab); John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, 3 July 1786 (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab)
a ConventionBook or text
Jefferson soon put this idea on paper as a proposed convention among the powers at war with the Barbary states, who would share the cost of a joint naval force. He worked it out with Lafayette and the comte d’Estaing and sent it to John Jay in October 1786, but no such league was formed.
Sources: Jefferson's Proposed Concert of Powers against the Barbary States, editorial note (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab); Proposed Convention against the Barbary States (Founders Online) (opens in a new tab)
imposed onWord
This means deceived or misled, an older sense of “impose on” that is now rare. Jefferson grants that his reasons may be mistaken but says they at least look sound. He is not saying that anyone burdened him.
Sources: Impose, Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913) (opens in a new tab); Impose, Dictionary.com (opens in a new tab)
Adams’s replyCross-reference
Adams answered on 31 July 1786. He wrote that the United States ought not to fight the Barbary states at all unless it meant to fight them forever. He added that Algiers had since been fortified all round, so a blockade like Massiac’s would now be harder.
Source and provenance
- Original text
Transcription from Founders Online (National Archives), as published in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson: From Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 11 July 1786 (opens in a new tab)
founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-10-02-0058
- Copy we read
Wayback Machine snapshot (opens in a new tab) of November 21, 2025. Founders Online returned errors when this edition was built, so the text was read from the Internet Archive’s copy of the page.
- Also printed in
- The Adams Papers (opens in a new tab) (founders.archives.gov)
- Modern text and notes
Drafted by AI agents under automatic checks for completeness, meaning and sources. This letter’s review is not yet complete. For scholarship, rely on the original text. How the modern text is made.
- How to cite
Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 11 July 1786. Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-10-02-0058. Modern text and notes: The Jefferson–Adams Letters, https://jefferson-adams-letters.pages.dev/letters/1786-07-11-jefferson-to-adams/.